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¿Por qué América Central y la República Dominicana aún no han alcanzado la estabilidad de precios? 
¿Por qué sus tasas de inflación son relativamente altas para los estándares latinoamericanos? El 
presente análisis aborda estas preguntas y encuentra que, a pesar del fortalecimiento institucional de la 
política monetaria alcanzado en los últimos años, siguen existiendo debilidades importantes en la 
mayoría de los bancos centrales. En particular, la ausencia de un mandato claro y la poca autonomía 
política estarían afectando adversamente la coherencia y la implementación de la política monetaria. 
El análisis empírico revela que todos los bancos centrales elevan sus tasas de interés con el fin de 
limitar la inflación, pero solamente algunos las aumentan lo suficiente como para contrarrestar 
efectivamente las presiones inflacionarias. Los resultados también muestran que algunos bancos 
centrales se preocupan simultáneamente de la estabilidad del tipo de cambio. El conflicto potencial 
que se presenta por el doble mandato a los bancos centrales y la respuesta impredecible de la política 
monetaria estaría minando la confianza de los mercados en el compromiso de los bancos centrales con 





Why hasn’t inflation converged to price stability in Central America and the Dominican Republic? 
Why is it currently still high by Latin American standards? This paper addresses these questions, and 
finds that despite the institutional strengthening of monetary policy, important flaws remain in most 
central banks, in particular the lack of a clear policy mandate and little political autonomy, which are 
hurting the consistency of policy implementation. Empirical analysis reveals that all central banks 
raise interest rates to curtail inflation, but only some of them make large enough increases to 
effectively tackle inflation pressures. It also shows that some central banks care simultaneously about 
exchange rate stability. The potential policy conflict arising from a dual central bank mandate and the 
unpredictable policy response is probably undermining market confidence in central banks’ 
commitment to price stability, thereby perpetuating an inflation bias. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Compared with the rest of Latin America, Central America and the Dominican Republic—
from now on referred only as Central America—have a history of low inflation. No country, 
except Nicaragua, fell into the clutches of hyperinflation, and during the late-1990s and early 
2000s, inflation dropped into single-digit rates (Figure 1). The downward trend in inflation 
across Central America has been accompanied by different patterns of monetary policy 
regimes. In addition to Panama’s century-old formal dollarization and the recently adopted 
dollarization in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua have chosen an exchange 
rate-based policy regime, whereas the Dominican Republic and Guatemala have in place 
money and inflation targeting regimes, respectively.
1 On these grounds, the dollarized 
economies abdicated their right to conduct monetary policy, whereas those using the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor maintained at best a little room for maneuver. Only 
countries with a flexible exchange rate regime have been in a position to preserve an 
independent conduct of monetary policy—provided the exchange rate is effectively floating. 
 
Nonetheless, price stability in most Central America has been elusive, and moreover, these 
countries seem to be vulnerable to a rebound in inflation as a result of exogenous shocks. 
Except for the formally dollarized economies, inflation in the Central American economies 
never converged to world inflation and rather, in the current decade, it has stalled above that 
in the historically high inflation countries in Latin America (Figure 2).  
 
This paper explores the monetary reasons underlying inflation’s performance in Central 
America during the recent period.
2 It addresses the question of why inflation has not yet 
converged to price stability and is relatively high, both in absolute terms and in comparison 
with the rest of Latin America. We define price stability as a situation of low and stable 
inflation, for example, similar to that in the United States—Central America’s main trading 
partner.
3 Implicitly, the paper stresses the importance of achieving price stability as it favors 
Central American countries in attaining maximum economic growth.
4 The analysis includes 





                                                 
1 This characterization is based on the 2005 IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. 
2 The paper does not examine cost-push factors stemming from the recent oil shock.  
 
3 As it is well known, there is no single definition of price stability, and hence, the notion of achieving low and 
stable inflation has become standard among academics and practitioners to refer to price stability.  
4 The empirical evidence suggests that inflation starts to restrict economic growth even at high single-digit rates 
of inflation (see Carstens and Jácome, 2005 for a brief tour of this literature). 
5 References to El Salvador and Panama are occasionally made but only for comparative purposes.   2
Figure 1. Inflation in Central America and the 
Western Hemisphere 
Figure 2. Inflation in Central America, the 




































































































Note: Central America excludes Nicaragua. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Note: Central America includes Nicaragua. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
              
In particular, our paper examines the institutional foundations underpinning the formulation 
and management of monetary policy and analyses empirically how central banks in Central 
America react in practice, which is eventually driving market expectations, and hence, 
inflation. The proposed analysis is relevant for both academic and policy reasons. Despite 
relatively high inflation in Central America, monetary policy has not been addressed recently 
in the literature, and hence, this paper makes an attempt to fill this void. The latest studies 
have rather focused on other macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, regional integration 
issues, and even on exchange rate policies without paying sufficient attention to monetary 
policies.
6 From a policy perspective, it provides “food for thought” to practitioners and 
policy-makers that seek to boost the effectiveness of monetary policy in Central America 
with the aim of achieving the elusive objective of price stability.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II examines the institutional basis 
underpinning the formulation of monetary policy in Central America. Section III seeks to 
characterize the implementation of monetary policy in these countries. Section IV explores 
empirical regularities about the conduct of monetary policy during the period 1996-2005. 
Section V provides the main conclusions of the analysis. In addition, Appendix I offers a 
stylized presentation of the legal basis for monetary policy in Central American countries and 
Appendix II spells out the responses from Central American central banks to a questionnaire 
regarding their policy objectives, as well as the instruments and operational arrangements 
underlying the conduct of monetary policy. 
 
                                                 
6 See the collection of papers on Central America in Rodlauer and Schipke (2005) and Rennhack and Offerdal 
(2004), in which an analysis of monetary policy is absent. 
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II.   THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MONETARY POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
During the last 15 years, all countries in Central America strengthened the institutional 
underpinnings for the formulation and execution of monetary policy.
7 New central bank 
legislation was enacted, starting with Nicaragua in 1992 (and 1999) and followed by Costa 
Rica in 1995, Honduras in 1996 (and 2004), and Guatemala and the Dominican Republic in 
2002. The new central bank charters mirrored the pattern of previous reforms adopted in 
other countries in Latin America.
8 These legal reforms were aimed at introducing price 
stability as a central bank policy objective, expanding their political and operational 
autonomy, and requiring central banks to be accountable and transparent. Despite this 
institutional strengthening, the reforms did not overcome important institutional flaws, which 
seem to be adversely affecting the conduct of monetary policy, thereby hampering central 
banks’ credibility and eventually undermining their ability to defeat inflation. We briefly 
discuss below the major components of central bank reforms in Central America and 
compare them with those adopted by the rest of Latin America. A stylized presentation of the 
main features of today’s central bank legislation in Central America is found in Appendix I. 
 
A.   A Snapshot of Central Banks’ Reforms and their Main Flaws 
Following institutional reforms, central banks in Central America no longer behave as 
development banks and are currently more focused on bringing down inflation. Like in the 
rest of Latin America, central banks used to mostly focus on fostering economic growth—
providing credit to specific sectors under preferential financial conditions—in line with 
governments’ economic policy priorities. Alternatively, the new legal mandate requires them 
to focus on arresting inflation as a necessary—although not sufficient—condition for 
economic growth, which reflects the consensus in the profession with respect to the inability 
of monetary policy to influence real variables. However, in some Central American 
countries, this policy mandate was accompanied by other objectives, such as preserving 
simultaneously the external value of their currencies. The coexistence of these two objectives 
has at times become mutually incompatible, in particular when the exchange rate went 
through periods of appreciation, which central banks sought to avoid despite their anti-
inflation effect.  
 
Changes in central banks’ policy mandate were not reinforced by strong political autonomy. 
De jure political autonomy is still weak in most central banks in Central America as central 
bank governors are appointed and potentially dismissed by the President of the Republic—
like it used to be before the monetary reform. In addition, central bank governors’ tenure 
coincide with that of the executive branch and in the Dominican Republic is even shorter 
(only two years). Hence, central banks’ policy formulation remains in theory closely tied to 
                                                 
7 Even El Salvador reformed its central bank law in 1991, before adopting the U.S. dollar as its legal tender in 
2001. 
 
8 See Carstens and Jácome (2005) for an extensive review of the nature and scope of central banks’ reform in 
Latin America. 
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the countries’ political business cycle, which restricts the chances of minimizing time-
inconsistency problems that result in an “inflation bias.” In addition, in countries such as the 
Dominican Republic and Guatemala, the private sector is still closely involved in the 
appointment of members of the central bank board, thereby providing another source of 
potential external influence on the formulation of monetary policy. 
 
Operational independence of central banks is today a common pattern region-wide, although 
a number of factors undermine such independence. In general, central banks in Central 
America exhibit instrument independence as they are empowered to freely execute monetary 
policy without interference from either the government or the private sector. In particular, 
central banks have the legal authority, to use monetary policy instruments to influence 
market interest rates, thereby potentially affecting aggregate demand, and hence, inflation. 
They are also legally restricted—and even prohibited like in Guatemala—to extend credit to 
finance government spending, except for short-term advances to cope with seasonal liquidity 
shortages (Honduras and Nicaragua). Furthermore, in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala, 
the central bank is a filter to restrain public debt increases, as it is legally required to provide 
a technical opinion about the appropriateness of new public debt issuance.  
 
However, operational autonomy is undermined in most countries because of central banks’ 
lack of effective financial autonomy or due to a subtle form of fiscal dominance. While the 
reform of central banks’ charter got rid of quasi-fiscal expenditures, they have accumulated 
over time significant losses stemming inter alia from their involvement in banking crises. 
More recently, the financial position of central banks has deteriorated due to the decline in 
inflation—which reduced seigniorage—and the increase in the costs of carrying growing 
international reserves. Central bank losses, if sufficiently large, may limit either their 
capacity to mop up excess liquidity or their ability to raise interest rates when conducting 
open-market-operations. Thus, higher interest payments become a source of monetization 
that requires subsequent sterilization efforts and generate additional costs—which central 
banks may seek to avoid in Central America. Thus, persistent large losses are, to some 
extent, limiting the operating capacity of central banks and eventually curtailing the 
effectiveness of monetary policy actions.
9 Against this backdrop, legal provisions to protect 
the integrity of central banks’ capital exist in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and 
Nicaragua, where governments are compelled to make up for central bank losses—if they can 
not be compensated with statutory reserves. In practice, this legal mandate has not 
materialized in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua and only partially in Guatemala, 
where the government covers central bank’s operational losses with a two year lag issuing 
securities at below-market interest rates. 
  
There are other factors that potentially can undermine central banks’ operational autonomy. 
For example, Guatemala faces a legal restriction on operational autonomy as the Congress 
has to authorize the issuance of central bank paper for open market operations purposes. In 
Honduras, the annual government’s budget approved by Congress establishes a mandatory 
                                                 
9 In most Central American countries, central bank losses exceed 1 percent of GDP every year. 
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transference (not a credit) from the central bank to the Government. Although these transfers 
have not been significant up to now, this practice represents a violation to the principle of 
banning central banks’ financing government’s expenditure. Another distorting practice is 
found in Costa Rica, where the central bank and the government conduct simultaneous 
auctions and bidders are assigned these securities indistinctively at a given—non-market 
determined—interest rate. The problem arises because the government and the central bank 
preferences are not compatible, which may happen because the former is guided by price 
considerations (the lowest interest rate to minimize debt services) and the latter by quantity 
criteria (tighten monetary policy). In practice, government preferences tend to prevail over 
those of the central bank, resulting on an interest rate that is not compatible with the 
monetary policy stance. 
  
On the other hand, accountability requirements are a key innovation in central bank 
legislation in Central America but there is still some room for improvement, including 
through transparency policies. With the current legal provisions, central banks have become 
more accountable with respect to the autonomy they enjoy, producing more timely reports 
about the general stance of monetary policy. This is a major upgrade with respect to the pre-
reform practice of simply preparing and publishing an annual report that covered major 
economic developments in the previous year. Nonetheless, central banks’ accountability 
might be further strengthened by gradually incorporating current policy analyses and 
projections into monetary and inflation reports, as many emerging markets are already doing, 
and by requiring central bank authorities to appear regularly in Congress to explain the 
policies adopted to achieve their targets. De jure transparency has also improved in most 
countries as all central banks are required to disclose their financial statements. However, 
financial statements are generally not compatible with international accounting standards, 
thereby undermining central banks’ transparency. 
 
In sum, while monetary policy in Central America has received an injection of institutional 
strength as a result of the reform of central banks’ legislation, important flaws still remain 
which undermine efforts to arrest inflation. The major flaws relate to the lack of an 
unequivocal policy mandate aimed at pursuing price stability as a primary objective, while 
political independence is still short of what is needed to secure an autonomous formulation of 
monetary policy over a long-term horizon. The absence of sufficient political autonomy also 
restricts central banks’ enhanced de jure operational autonomy, given that the execution of 
monetary policy must observe the guidelines laid out by non-independent central bank 
governing bodies. These institutional weaknesses may be potentially hindering central banks’ 
credibility, which is reflected in a persistent “inflation bias” or in higher interest rates than 
would otherwise be required to defeat inflation. 
 
B.   Legal Central Bank Independence 
As a result of its legal reform, central banks in Central America achieved enhanced 
institutional strength in all fronts, thereby increasing their autonomy to formulate and execute 
monetary policy. With the aim of measuring the augmented independence of central banks, 
we use an index that, in essence, gives credit for legal provisions that grant central banks the   6
institutional capacity to arrest inflation and penalizes their role as government financiers and 
active participants of the political business cycle.  
 
We borrow from Jácome and Vázquez (2005) the index of legal central bank independence, 
which is built on the spirit of Cukierman’s index (Cukierman, 1992), the best known and 
most widely accepted metric to assess central banks’ legal independence. The index used in 
this paper comprises the same four criteria as in Cukierman’s index to capture key features of 
central banks’ legal independence, namely: (i) political independence; (ii) policy mandate;            
(iii) policy formulation; and (iv) central banks’ lending provisions, plus a fifth criterion that 
measures accountability and transparency provisions. Specifically, the index gives credit to 
central banks that feature enhanced political independence, which implies having a 
government body whose appointment and removal is not in the hands of the executive 
exclusively—but, typically, also of the legislative—and its tenure exceed the presidential 
term. The index also assigns the highest marks to those central banks that primarily pursue 
the objective of preserving price stability. In addition, the index rewards autonomous central 
banks in the formulation of monetary policy. The fourth criterion favors central banks that 
face restrictions to lend to the government, that have limited capacities to act as lender of last 
resort, and that have the government legally required to assure central banks’ financial 
independence. The fifth criterion positively evaluates central banks’ accountability and 
transparency requirements. 
 
Figure 3. Legal Central Banks Independence 
(Before and after the reform) 
Figure 4. Legal Central Banks Independence  































































































Source: Jácome and Vázquez (2005).   
 
With the help of this index we assess the new central bank independence in Central America 
on a time and regional dimensions. By assessing old and new central banks’ legislation—and 
the relevant aspects of the national constitutions—we come to the conclusion that central 
banks are today significantly more independent than in their pre-reform period (Figure 3).
10 
                                                 
10 As an exception, Honduras increased significantly the independence of its central bank in 1996 but recently, 
in 2004, a new law was approved, which implied a slightly backward step.   7
On a regional perspective, despite the achievements of these institutional reforms, Central 
American central banks still lag behind most in South America and Mexico, in particular 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru (Figure 4). 
 
A cluster analysis allows us to confirm that the major institutional weaknesses effectively 
relate to political autonomy and policy mandate. When the index of central bank 
independence is broken down into the five main criteria described above, the results show 
that these are the criteria explaining why Central American central banks lag behind other 
central banks in the region (Table 1). However, Central America performs better when 
measuring the autonomy for policy formulation since other countries in Latin America, such 
as Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, face de jure influences from the executive and 
legislative branches in the formulation of exchange rate policy.
11 Another factor underlying 
this result stems from the provision that gives powers to central banks to restrict public debt 
expansion, a feature rewarded in the index that is found in most central bank laws in Central 
America.
12 On the other hand, both groups of countries rank nearly even in terms of 
restrictions on lending and accountability provisions. 
 
Table 1. Central Banks’ Legal Independence as of 2005 
(Central America versus South America and Mexico) 
 
  South America and Mexico   Central America 
Total index */  0.769  0.697 
Political autonomy (1)  0.759  0.318 
Central bank mandate (2)  0.800  0.650 
Monetary policy formulation (3)  0.720  0.896 
Central bank lending (4)  0.753  0.804 
Accountability (5)  0.875  0.800 
 
*/ Total index = 0.20*(1) + 0.15*(2) + 0.15*(3) + 0.40(4) + 0.10 (5). See Jácome and Vázquez (2005)  
to know the categories behind each criterion and the rationale for the weight assigned to them. 
 
 
The different degrees of legal central bank independence seem to be factored into inflation 
performance in Latin America. As shown in Table 2, Central America features lower and 
more stable inflation following the institutional reform of monetary policy, except for the 
Dominican Republic, where the systemic banking crisis disrupted monetary policy 
management. More generally, as shown by Jácome and Vázquez (2005), there is empirical 
evidence of a negative relationship between legal central bank independence and inflation at 
a regional level during a period that includes pre and post-reform years.  
 
 
                                                 
11 While, in practice, this distortion is less of a problem when countries have in place a flexible exchange rate—
like in Mexico—it still restricts central banks’ autonomy because they cannot design independently a policy of 
international reserves’ accumulation, which indirectly affects exchange rate management. 
 
12 This criterion is a modified approach of the one included in Cukierman’s index.   8
 
Table 2. Inflation performance in Central America 
(Before and after the reform) 
 
  Pre-reform (10 years before)  Post-reform (up to 10 years after) 
 Mean  Standard  deviation  Mean Standard  deviation 
Costa Rica  18.21 5.71 11.51  1.61 
Dominican Repub.  7.29 2.38 27.70  23.63 
Guatemala  8.48 2.27 7.32  1.81 
Honduras  23.13 19.64 10.95  4.01 
Nicaragua  1053.74 2440.49 7.68  2.80 
       
       Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
Nonetheless, Central American central banks seem to be less successful in containing 
inflation pressures from negative shocks. Based on the developments stemming from the 
recent oil shock, we claim that more autonomous central banks have better chances of 
preserving inflation under control under adverse circumstances. The rationale for this 
hypothesis derives from the credibility that more autonomous central banks enjoy with 
respect to their commitment to maintain inflation in check even under adverse conditions. To 
support this view, we provide soft evidence that central bank independence in Latin America 
did matter in coping with the inflationary effects of the recent oil shock.  
 
By comparing central banks’ independence and inflation in the region before and during the 
worse of the oil crisis, it seems that more independent institutions have been in a stronger 
position to weather the inflationary effects of the oil shock. Figures 5 and 6 portrait the 
correlation between central banks’ independence and inflation during the periods 2000-2003 
and 2004–2005, where the latter captures the worst of the oil shock.
13 The charts show a 
much stronger correlation during the crisis years, when the credibility of central banks were 




In particular, in the wake of the oil shock, inflation surged more in Central America than in 
most countries in the region. This outcome seems to suggest that Central American central 
banks probably enjoy less credibility with respect to their commitment to price stability. 
Although one can argue that this is explained because the Central American economies are 
oil importers and shifted the whole increase in oil prices to domestic fuel prices, it is also true 
that other countries in the region applied the same policy rule and yet they have achieved a 
better inflation performance. Specifically, Chile and even Peru—with the most independent 
                                                 
13 Central America exhibits the highest average inflation in Latin America in 2004–2005—except for 
Venezuela, with the Dominican Republic performing as an outlier due to the effects of the 2003 banking crisis. 
14 The thrust of the argument prevails when we exclude the Dominican Republic from the charts, which is 
explained, in part, because central banks in countries, like Colombia, Mexico, Chile in 2004, and Peru in 2005, 
continued making progress in taming inflation despite the adverse effects of the oil shock.   9
central banks in the region—have also allowed a high pass-through from world oil prices to 
domestic fuel prices.
15 However, the increase in fuel prices in these countries apparently was 
not factored into the consumer price index as much as in the Central American economies. 
 
Figure 5. Inflation and Legal Central Banks’ 
Independence in Latin America. 2000–2003 
Figure 6. Inflation and Legal Central Banks’ 
























































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and Jácome and Vázquez (2005) 
 
 
III.   CHARACTERIZING MONETARY POLICY: A PRELIMINARY VIEW 
Despite being small and open economies and having similar trade partners, the Central 
American countries have adopted different monetary policy regimes. According to the 
answers provided by their central banks to the questionnaire sent in preparation for this study 
(see Appendix II), Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua claim to follow an exchange rate 
targeting regime. On the other hand, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala allow the 
exchange rate to adjust—although, in practice, with limitations—and claim to be money and 
inflation targeters, respectively. This section discusses the main features characterizing the 
formulation and implementation of monetary policy in the five countries and takes a first 
look at the data to support their characterization.  
 
To better understand how monetary policy is formulated and executed under each policy 
regime, we base our analysis on a taxonomy of monetary policy strategies that encompass the 
three policy modalities in Central America (Table 3). This taxonomy provides a simple 
analytical framework to characterize the nature of monetary policy regimes and their 
associated operational arrangements. It is also a useful toolkit to examine the links that in 
theory exist between monetary policy goals, the corresponding intermediate targets, and the 
operational arrangements supporting monetary policy implementation. The key notion behind 
                                                 
15 According to IMF (2006), the pass-through to domestic gasoline prices during 2004-2005 in Peru and the 
Dominican Republic was about the same and well above 1 (1.31 and 1.35), whereas the pass-through for diesel 
were larger in Peru—and Colombia—than in the Dominican Republic (0.94, 0.81, and 0.76, respectively).   10
this taxonomy is that targeting money and inflation is consistent with a strategy of allowing 
the exchange rate to work as the main absorber in response to policy-induced or exogenous 
shocks, whereas exchange rate targeting relies on international reserves as its primary shock 
absorber. In addition, although money and inflation targeting share the same primary goal, 
they differ on what are the intermediate and operational targets they use to achieve their final 
policy goal. In turn, exchange rate targeting typically assigns priority to the competitiveness 
of tradable activities as the main policy objective and relies on the real exchange rate and the 
rate of crawl as intermediate and operational targets, respectively. 
 
Table 3. Taxonomy of Monetary Policy Strategies 
 
  Monetary targeting  Exchange rate 
targeting 
Inflation targeting 
Final policy goal  Inflation  Competitiveness    Inflation 
Secondary policy goal  Competitiveness  Inflation  Competitiveness 
      
Intermediate target  Money supply  Real exchange rate  Forecasted inflation 
      
Operational target  Money base  Rate of crawl   Overnight interest rate 
      
Primary shock absorber  Nominal exchange rate  International reserves  Nominal exchange rate 
Secondary shock absorber  Real in interest rate  Real interest rate  Real interest rate 
 
 
A.   Formulation and Implementation of Monetary Policy in Central America 
Against this backdrop and regardless of the monetary strategy chosen, all countries in Central 
America share a common analytical policy framework, namely financial programming, 
which serve as the basis for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy.
16 
Central banks identify an inflation target for the corresponding calendar year, and project 
accordingly the performance of monetary aggregates and define seasonal targets.  They then 
adjust monetary policy should deviations from monetary targets occur. As a special case, 
Nicaragua claims to target only inflation by using the exchange rate crawl as its nominal 
anchor—or its intermediate target—with the support of a given amount of international 
reserves to ensure the viability of the exchange rate regime. Interest rate and monetary 
aggregates are left as shock absorbers. 
 
Regarding policy formulation and with the aim of shaping operational autonomy—
established in the new central bank charters—most countries in Central America have created 
open market operation committees. This new institutional arrangement is intended to 
strengthen and speed up short-term policy responsiveness and separate the execution from 
the formulation of monetary policy—the latter typically a responsibility of central bank 
boards in these countries. This reform is particularly important in Central America, given the 
limited political independence of central banks (see Section II). Yet, the institutional reform 
                                                 
16 See Appendix II for specifications about monetary policy in Central America.   11
has not borne all its fruit given that the conduct of monetary policy exhibits important flaws 
as we discuss below. 
 
The main instrument used in monetary policy implementation is open market operations, 
although changes in reserve requirements are also used from time to time. Open market 
operations are used to steer monetary aggregates within the limits established in central 
banks’ financial programming. In practice, however, the effectiveness of open market 
operations is undermined because they are not executed under market premises. In particular, 
interest rates are not allowed to adjust to reflect market preferences and expectations, and 
rather, central banks use cut-off rates that restrain interest rate increases either because of 
potential political pressures that see such increases as hindering economic growth, or due to 
the limitations imposed by the already-weak financial position of most central banks.
17 As 
central banks’ operating losses become an increasing constraint, markets may have doubts 
about the long-term ability of central banks to conduct monetary policy and preserve price 
stability. In addition to using open market operations as a policy instrument, in the recent 
past, central banks in Central America—except Guatemala—have also used changes in 
reserve requirements to moderate excessive liquidity abundance. Given that bank reserves are 
not remunerated, central banks feel tempted to use reserve requirements as a costless policy 
instrument to mop-up large amounts of liquidity. 
 
Another important flaw of central banks’ monetary implementation is the lax management of 
short-term liquidity. While most central banks conduct some form of liquidity projections, 
they are unable of maintaining a tight control of systemic liquidity, and rather liquidity 
surplus prevails in all countries. The preferred modality of liquidity projections in Central 
America is based on an extrapolation of financial programming, which gives central banks an 
idea of the existing systemic liquidity on a weekly basis vis-à-vis the projected trends of 
monetary aggregates. Based on this information, central banks get a sense of the needs of 
injecting or extracting liquidity, which not necessarily materialize because of pitfalls in 
conducting open market operations as argued above. The described situation opposes to what 
other central banks in the region do (like in Brazil and Mexico), as they generally maintain 
the system short and provide systemic liquidity according to their monetary policy stance. 
 
At the same time, most central banks in Central America have recently adopted a policy rate 
with the aim of boosting the effectiveness of monetary policy; however, this policy decision 
has been ineffective. Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Honduras have 
recently established a short-term interest rate, and are using it as an operational instrument 
and to signal changes in the monetary policy stance and guide market expectations. In 
practice, however, the policy rate is playing little or no role, as its changes are rarely 





                                                 
17 In Central America, central bank deficits are as high as more than 1 percent of GDP in most countries.    12
Figure 7. Policy Rates versus Banks’ Lending Rates 
 






































































































Source: Central banks.  
 
The lack of central banks’ proper liquidity management and the shallowness of money 
markets help to explain the disconnection between central banks’ policy rates and 
commercial bank interest rates. On the one hand, in the absence of proper liquidity 
management central banks’ policy rate generally does not reflect the underlying systemic 
liquidity conditions, and hence, changes in the policy rate are not necessarily followed by 
market interest rates. On the other hand, the limited development of interbank and money 
markets, reduces the significance of interest rates and tend to make them more volatile. The 
large liquidity surpluses observed in the last years in all Central American countries 
exacerbates the difficulties encountered by central banks to manage systemic liquidity and 
stifles the development of interbank and money markets. This is because most central banks 
are reluctant to drain the large liquidity surplus because of their weak financial position, 
which leaves market participants with long positions, and hence, without the need of trading 
among each other. In this environment, a meaningful yield curve is absent in all countries, 
which imposes important limitations on market participant decisions and restricts valuable 
information to central banks about markets’ expectations. Moreover, the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy is hindered because of the limited effect of central bank 
policies on aggregate demand and inflation. 
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B.   A First Look at the Data 
A quick look to the volatilities of key monetary variables in each country between 2000 and 
2005 shed some light to characterize in practice monetary policy in Central America. The 
analysis attaches special interest to the performance of exchange rates and international 
reserves as they implicitly define which variable is targeted and what the main shock 
absorber is. To obtain a better sense of the information these numbers convey, we compare 
them to similar computations for other Latin American countries, which include an exchange 
rate targeter, like Bolivia, and inflation targeters, such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. 
 
On a preliminary basis, we label Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and to less extent Honduras, as 
exchange rate targeters. As observed in Table 4, Costa Rica indeed features the lowest 
exchange rate variability among the Central American countries and uses international 
reserves as the first line of defense to adjust against shocks. This is not surprising because, 
during the period of analysis, the Central Bank of Costa Rica pre-announced the colón 
devaluation rate for the following year and rarely made adjustments to the pre-announced 
path. Unlike the former, the Central Bank of Nicaragua, although targeting the exchange rate, 
does not allow international reserves to vary significantly; alternatively, it is the real interest 
rate which seems to work as a shock absorber, which is consistent with the information 
provided in the answers to the questionnaire. In turn, it is difficult to identify what is the 
main shock absorber in Honduras. 
 
On the other hand, it appears difficult to characterize the policy regime embraced by the 
Dominican Republic and, in particular, by Guatemala. These countries feature greater 
exchange rate flexibility than the other three—although much less than the inflation targeting 
countries in Latin America—and a volatility of international reserves similar to the one 
featured by the exchange rate targeters.
18 On these grounds, Guatemala does not seem to be 
operating yet as an inflation targeter but rather it approximates more to an exchange rate 
targeter given the high variability of the international reserves. This conclusion is reinforced 
as we focus on the last three years, when the standard deviation of the exchange rate 
depreciation was only 0.20. 
 
The performance of real interest rates—with respect to contemporaneous inflation—does not 
exhibit major differences across countries, which suggests that all countries in Central 
America also use real interest rates as shock absorber. This outcome is not surprising. Most 
central banks in developing and emerging countries, regardless of their policy regime, seem 
to adjust interest rates to contribute, either to preserve a high international reserves and 
mitigate excessive exchange rate volatility—in the exchange rate targeting countries—or to 
affect aggregate demand, and hence, the intermediate target—in money and inflation 
targeting countries. 
 
                                                 
18 The volatility of international reserves in the Dominican Republic is partly explained by its rapid decline in 
2002 as the systemic banking crisis started to unfold.    14
Table 4. Volatilities of Selected Macroeconomic Variables 





reserves  (% change) 
Real  interest 
rates 
  Central America and the Dominican Republic 
Costa Rica  0.13  7.54  2.19 
Dominican Rep. 1/  1.14  9.88  3.11 
Guatemala 1/  0.71  6.69  1.74 
Honduras 0.16  2.92  1.42 
Nicaragua 1/,2/  0.05  7.40  3.75 
  Other selected countries in Latin America 
Bolivia 0.27  8.43  3.67 
Chile 2.51  2.62  2.60 
Colombia 2.23  2.41  1.36 
Mexico 1.71  2.89  2.52 
Peru 0.93  3.04  4.72 
          
        Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
1/ The calculations cover the period 1996-2002 in the Dominican Republic and 2002 onward in 
Nicaragua, to avoid capturing the effects on monetary variables of their systemic banking crises, 
whereas in Guatemala, the period starts after a large privatization that took place by late-2001 and 
resulted on a once and for all 50 percent increase in international reserves. 
2/ For Nicaragua, given the lack of consistent central bank’s interest rate series, the 1-month 




IV.   EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES SUPPORTING THE CHARACTERIZATION OF MONETARY 
POLICY 
How does the former characterization of monetary policy can be reconciled with actual 
central bank policies in Central America? This section addresses this question by estimating 
central banks’ reaction functions and assessing how central banks have reacted in practice to 
shifts in underlying economic fundamentals, especially inflation, in each country. The main 
idea behind the proposed analysis is to ascertain whether central banks in Central America 
work under clear, effective, and predictable rules, which makes them more likely to deliver 
overtime lower inflation rates. 
 
We also test reaction functions of the exchange rate crawl and the money base. The former is 
applicable, in particular to countries that feature exchange rate-based stabilization policies, 
like Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and the latter to the Dominican Republic, 
although it may also capture the behavior of the Bank of Guatemala during the late 1990s. 
Expanding the analysis from the standard reaction function based on the interest rate as the   15




A.   Methodology and Data 
We consider a mix of policy instruments to estimate separately several policy reaction 
functions along the general lines of Taylor (1993), Parrado (2004), and McCallum (1988), 
respectively, depending on the instrument considered:
20 
 
  () ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 tt n t m t t ix i ρ αρ β π ρ γρ ε ++ − =− +− +− + +,   (1) 
  
  () ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 tt n t m t t ex e ρ αρ β π ρ γρε ++ − ∆ =− +− +− + ∆ +, (2) 
 
     () ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 tt n t m t t mx m ρ αρ β π ρ γρ ε ++ − ∆=− +− +− + ∆ +, (3) 
 
where i is a policy interest rate, typically a short-term interest rate, π is the inflation rate,  x 
is the output gap, m is a monetary aggregate defined as the intermediate target (typically the 
money base), and e is the exchange rate. We estimate the reaction functions using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
 
Equation (1) provides the critical analytical framework to assess central banks’ reaction 
functions. Regardless of their monetary regime, central banks tend to use interest rate as an 
instrument to tackle inflation, influence economic activity, and even affect developments in 
the foreign exchange rate market. In particular, monetary-based policy regimes adjust interest 
rates to affect monetary aggregates and indirectly inflation. In turn, central banks that have 
adopted exchange rate crawls use interest rates as a policy instrument to defend the peg and 
to protect international reserves in times of financial turbulence. Inflation targeting countries 
adjust the interest rate as a policy variable to guide expectations and steer actual inflation 
toward forecasted inflation. 
  
Equation (2) usually provides valuable information about countries using an exchange rate 
crawl as a policy instrument, but it may also be relevant when it comes to floating exchange 
regimes. Typically, this equation assumes that the rate of crawl is regularly adjusted to 
compensate for inflation differentials with respect to its “target.” A clear example of this 
policy approach is found in Singapore, where the monetary authorities presume that small 
open economies cannot manage interest rates and only have control over the exchange rate.
21 
                                                 
19 Corbo (2002) finds that, in setting their policy rates, central banks consider not only inflation but also other 
objectives such as output and the exchange rate. 
 
20 For further details see Appendix III. 
21 In particular, the Monetary Authority of Singapore uses explicitly a trade weighted index to conduct monetary 
policy and offset fluctuations both in inflation and output. See Parrado (2004).   16
In some countries, this policy rule may also serve to compensate for differentials between 
actual and potential output. Under this approach, this policy rule may not be as relevant in 
Central America. While targeting the exchange rate may give some signals about the long-
term direction of exchange rate policy, in the short run this information has less of a 
foundation in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, as their central banks tend to favor a predictable 
path for the exchange rate, and hence do not use it as a policy instrument on a short-term 
basis. Honduras, in turn, can adjust the rate of crawl on a short-term basis, and hence, has the 
potential for using it as a policy instrument either to moderate inflation or to target a real 
exchange rate. On the other hand, equation (2) may also be relevant to gauge whether central 
banks using flexible exchange rate regimes de facto care about the competitiveness of 
tradable activities—by means of interventions in the foreign exchange market. 
 
The specification in equation (3) is tailored to capture the policy reaction of central banks 
that directly adjust monetary aggregates in response, for example, to inflation pressures. 
Thus, it is applicable to central banks that have in place a flexible exchange rate regime, 
which makes room for an exogenous management of monetary aggregates. Nonetheless, the 
experiment may also apply to exchange rate targeters (Honduras and Nicaragua), which have 
negotiated successive economic programs with the IMF during the period of analysis, which 
typically demand a tightening of monetary policy to cope with inflation pressures. 
 
As a baseline specification, we consider output and inflation as the standard targets of 
monetary policy in the reaction functions of central banks as it is standard in the literature. 
However, depending on the reaction function, we also include other objectives such as the 
exchange rate, the real exchange rate, and international reserves into the baseline 
specification and analyze the behavior of some key model parameters. In the baseline 
specification, we pay special attention to the parameters associated with inflation and to less 
extent to output. This is because, as discussed before, fighting inflation is a key feature in 
Central American central banks’ mandate whereas output stability or fostering economic 
growth is not an objective in their charter any more. 
 
The analysis is based on monthly data for 1996–2005.
22 The selected period corresponds to 
the time span that follows the inception of the new institutional setting that granted most 
central banks enhanced operational autonomy. Choosing this period allows for isolating the 
analysis from the first half of the 1990s, when Central America experienced a steep decrease 
in inflation, which would probably distort the empirical analysis. To control for the adverse 
effects of systemic banking crises on monetary policy, we included dummy variables. In 
particular, the estimations control for the expansionary monetary stance associated with 
central banks’ involvement in the full-fledged banking crises that hit Nicaragua in 2001–02 
and the Dominican Republic in 2003. In addition, to test whether the Bank of Guatemala has 
                                                 
22 The data for the Dominican Republic was collected on a quarterly basis, given that this country lacks a 
monthly measure of economic activity.   17
been lately formulating monetary policy as an inflation targeter we run a second experiment 
considering the period late-2001 to 2005.
23 
 
The data series were obtained directly from each central bank. The quality of the data is 
rather good, except for the monthly series of economic activity, which is an imperfect 
substitute of a gross domestic product series. On a country basis, a consistent series for 
central bank interest rate in Nicaragua is not available, and hence, we used the one month 
deposit interest rate in commercial bank as an imperfect substitute. In addition, measures of 
output gap are not available, and hence, output is used directly. With these caveats in mind, 
we should be cautious in being too conclusive when interpreting the outcome of the empirical 
assessment of the central bank reaction functions in Central America, particularly when it 
comes to analyzing the response of policy instruments to output behavior. 
 
B.   Estimations 
The results stemming from this quantitative analysis shed some light about central banks’ 
actual policy implementation. In particular, they show that, regardless of the monetary 
regime, all central banks respond by raising interest rates in light of inflation pressures.
24 
However, the magnitude of the response differs across countries, which suggests that some 
central banks are a priori more effective than others in coping with inflation pressures. The 
estimations also stress that some central banks simultaneously seek to preserve exchange rate 
stability—which can be a source of policy conflicts—and reveal the difficulties of effectively 
targeting the real exchange rate. Finally, they suggest that most central banks tighten money 
to tackle inflation, regardless of whether they target money or the exchange rate. 
 
Interest rate reaction functions 
 
Assuming a forward-looking horizon of zero months, the coefficients associated with 
inflation are positive and statistically significant in all countries.
25 They indicate that in 
response to a 1 percent change in inflation, the interest rate is modified in the range of 0.6 to 
nearly 2 percent depending on each country (Table 5). The coefficient associated with 
inflation is higher than 1 in Costa Rica and, in particular, in Guatemala—in both samples 
alike—, which implies that the real interest rate moves in the same direction as the nominal 
                                                 
23 While the Bank of Guatemala claims to have gradually started the transition to inflation targeting since 2000, 
we chose to artificially divide the two periods in connection with a large sovereign debt placement that took 
place by late-2001, which produced a once and for all 50 percent increase in international reserves, and hence a 
structural brake in the series. 
24 The assumption behind these experiments is that central banks adjust autonomously interest rates and not 
automatically as a result of market trends. 
25 This assumption implies that n=m=0 in the base line rule (1). While it is possible that central banks do not 
observe both data on inflation and output simultaneously, in particular because the latter is observed with a 
short lag, the current analysis assumes that central banks have perfect foresight in terms of output. In an 
augmented policy rule that includes, for example, the real exchange rate, the same assumption applies.   18
rate. This means that the interest rate is temporarily altered to potentially affect aggregate 
demand, and thus, inflation (the aggregate demand function is then negatively sloped with 
respect to the inflation rate). At the other extreme, the value of the inflation coefficient in the 
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Honduras suggests that, in practice, there is a partial 
accommodative reaction as the increase in nominal interest rates in response to inflationary 
pressures is insufficient to prevent the real interest rate from falling. This outcome could be 
explained because central banks in these countries may also use other policy instruments to 
cope with inflation pressures. 
 














Costa Rica  1.05 *  – 0.16 *  1.25 *  - 0.27  2.53 * 
  (90.03)  (2.17) (3.21) (1.07) (3.98) 
Guatemala-1  0.94 *  – 0.11 *  1.98 *  1.11 *  0.66 * 
  (155.98)  (2.88) (5.32) (2.14) (5.68) 
Guatemala-2  0.96 *  - 0.06 *  1.93 *  - 0.21  0.48 * 
  (476.23)  (3.67) (9.17) (0.69) (4.98) 
Honduras  0.93 *  – 0.01  0.62 *  0.62 *  0.89 * 
 (72.89)  (0.46)  (1.72  )  (4.99)  (3.38) 
Nicaragua
2  0.96 *  – 0.06 *  0.71 *  - 0.02  0.73 * 
 (87.62)  (1.83)  (2.18  )  (0.17)  (5.10) 
Dominican Republic
2  0.40  - 0.07  0.70 *  2.19 *  0.03 
  (1.41)  (0.77) (4.36) (2.05) (0.25) 
 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Coefficients are statistically significant at 5 percent level.  
Guatemala-1 is based on the 1996-2005 period and Guatemala-2 corresponds to the late-2001 to 2005 period, when the 
Bank of Guatemala started to formulate and implement monetary policy as an inflation targeter. 
1 Estimations for the Dominican Republic are based on quarterly data. 
2 Dummy variables are used to control for banking crises periods. 
 
The estimations also show that central banks react positively to exchange rate depreciations. 
This relationship has at least two possible readings, depending on the monetary policy regime 
in each country, which eventually point to a scenario of “fear of floating.” In an environment 
of exchange rate targeting (Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua), central banks may 
increase interest rates in response to exchange rate depreciations in order to preserve a 
covered interest parity condition. Rising interest rates may also be the case—in particular in 
Costa Rica because of the high value of the exchange rate coefficient—to defend the pre-
announced exchange rate path, thereby preventing major disturbances in the foreign 
exchange market, which potentially could have a negative impact on market participants’ 
balance sheets. Alternatively, when it comes to money and inflation targeting, this reaction 
may show that central banks also care about exchange rate stability.  
 
The affection that central banks hold for preserving the external stability of their currencies 
could be justified on many possible fronts. One explanation is that central banks believe that 
exchange rate pass-through to prices is significant and hence they need to cap exchange rate   19
swings. This is a plausible explanation in small and very open economies, like in Central 
America, where exchange rate performance has a great impact on price formation. An 
alternative rationalization is that central banks assign a relatively higher weight to the 
exchange rate to maintain trade competitiveness and even financial stability. Regarding the 
latter, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that the “fear of floating” found in a number of 
emerging markets is explained by the high risk premium they have to pay because of their 
low institutional and policy credibility. The resistance to floating the exchange rate may be 
predominantly high in countries with shallow markets that are subject to herd behavior. Also, 
financial imperfections such as a large external debt or debt indexed to the exchange rate, as 
in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, make the case for preventing exchange rate fluctuations. 
Eichengreen (2002) and Goldstein and Turner (2004) have recently highlighted the adverse 
consequences of exchange rate depreciations in countries with a high degree of dollarization. 
Sharp currency depreciations can cause widespread bankruptcies as a result of their adverse 
effect on unhedged borrowers. This rather unconventional and contractionary impact of 
exchange rate depreciations makes it necessary for central banks to raise interest rates 
defensively against major exchange rate shocks.  
 
Because of the caveats associated with measures of output in Central America, it is worth 
cautiously mentioning the seemingly counter-cyclical role of some central banks. Guatemala, 
Honduras, and, in particular, the Dominican Republic, seem to reduce interest rates to 
confront a slowdown in economic activity. In addition, some central banks adjust inversely 
interest rates to changes in international reserves. In particular, central banks in Nicaragua, 
the Dominican Republic, and especially Costa Rica, appear to raise interest rates to safeguard 
the stability of international reserves (not reported). One can understand this behavior as an 
effort of central banks to underpin the stability of the exchange rate, which in countries with 
high capital mobility critically hinges on preserving an appropriate level of international 
reserves. 
 
Exchange rate crawl reaction function 
 
While the estimates of this reaction function have generally resulted in unstable and rather 
erratic coefficients, depending on the combination of endogenous variables, some interesting 
results are worth mentioning from our experiments.
26 We run a baseline scenario with a 
forward-looking horizon of zero months, except for the real exchange rate, which is lagged 
one period.
27 The estimates show that, among the exchange rate targeters, only Cost Rica 
designs its exchange rate policy with the aim of preserving the competitiveness of domestic 
                                                 
26 Even at a conceptual level, the impact of changes in the rate of crawl on inflation and output volatility is 
unclear and depends on the characteristics of the monetary transmission channels. Should the interest rate effect 
dominate the exchange rate effect, at least in the short run, a demand shock may need to be met by an increase 
in the rate of crawl (that allows a rise in interest rates). A reduction in the rate of crawl would otherwise be 
appropriate. 
27 The real exchange rate is lagged in order to avoid collinearity with the nominal exchange rate. A one-month 
lag reflects the delay in the availability of this information in the Central American central banks.    20
activities, given that the coefficient associated with the inflation rate is positive and 
statistically significant (Table 6). Strikingly, the results also show that Guatemala features an 
accommodative exchange rate policy with respect to inflation, which points in the direction 
of a central bank that cares about tradable activities—as observed before—even during the 
transition to an inflation targeting regime. In this connection, an accommodative exchange 
rate policy in response to inflation may cast doubts on market participants about the true 
central banks’ primary objective. Seeking to simultaneously preserve the internal and 
external value of domestic currencies may become mutually incompatible, particularly when 
the country experiences exchange rate appreciation trends. 
 














Costa Rica  0.94 *   0.02    0.39 *  0.55 *  0.06 
  (129.02)  (1.41) (3.71) (8.66)  (1.63) 
Guatemala-1  0.65 *   0.03  - 0.18  0.92 *  - 0.69 * 
  (9.18)  (1.62) (0.74) (5.40)  (9.08) 
Guatemala-2  0.51 *   - 0.03 *  1.16 *  - 1.21 *  - 0.77 * 
 (11.60)  (3.65)  (13.44)  (10.52)  (17.26) 
Honduras 1.04  *  0.12  -  0.78  0.25  0.16 
 (49.35)  (1.12)  (0.63  )  (1.47)  (0.35) 
Nicaragua
3  1.01 *   0.10  - 0.15  0.20  - 0.35 
  (187.74)  (1.24) (0.18) (0.47)  (1.49) 
Dominican Republic
3  0.69 *  0.54  - 2.82  - 3.90 *  2.33 
  (2.76)  (1.04) (1.07) (0.90)  (1.34) 
 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Coefficients are statistically significant at 5 percent level.  
Guatemala-1 is based on the 1996-2005 period and Guatemala-2 corresponds to the late-2001 to 2005 period, when the 
Bank of Guatemala started to formulate and implement monetary policy as an inflation targeter. 
1 Estimations for the Dominican Republic are based on quarterly data. 
2 A fall in the real exchange rate implies an appreciation and viceversa. 
3 Dummy variables are used to control for banking crises periods. 
 
The results also show that maintaining a stable real exchange rate is a difficult endeavor. This 
may be due to the use of a backward-looking rule in announcing the future path of the peg in 
an environment of unstable inflation, which makes it more difficult to target a given real 
exchange rate. Strikingly, by managing the exchange rate more flexibly—although 
intervening in the exchange rate market—the Bank of Guatemala has preserved a real 
exchange rate parity, which signals its concern for an exchange rate that is either appreciated 
or depreciated in real terms. The failure of most central banks in Central America to maintain 
a given real exchange rate level is in accordance with the conventional wisdom that claims 
that real exchange rates are endogenous in the short run. 
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Money base reaction function 
 
The results from the money reaction function are mixed for both money and exchange rate 
targeters (Table 7). Among the former, only Bank of Guatemala appears to tighten the money 
base to cope with inflation pressures, whereas the coefficient of inflation in the Dominican 
Republic has the expected sign but is not statistically significant. The value of the 
coefficients also suggests that the use of the money base to tackle inflation pressures has 
declined in Guatemala during the transition to inflation targeting. As for the exchange rate 
targeters, despite the limitations that targeting the exchange rate impose on the control of 
monetary variables, the central banks in Nicaragua and, in particular in Honduras, seem to 
have a strong capacity to tighten the money base in response to inflation.  
 













Costa Rica  0.90 *  – 0.40 *  2.25  0.65  3.34 * 
  (52.84)  (2.74) (1.61) (0.78) (1.83) 
Guatemala-1  0.87 *  0.10  - 2.38 *  7.95 *  - 0.82 * 
  (22.24)  (1.23) (2.73) (3.78) (2.22) 
Guatemala-2  0.57 *  0.19 *  - 0.79 *  - 1.16 *  0.51 * 
  (12.90)  (16.19)  (6.02) (2.31) (4.98) 
Honduras  0.93 *  0.67 *  - 6.99 *  - 3.26 *  5.39 * 
  (43.85)  (3.37) (2.75) (2.54) (2.84) 
Nicaragua
2  0.54 *  0.21 *  - 1.20 *  - 0.41 *  1.26 * 
 (10.74)  (5.77)  (2.94  )  (3.13)  (4.88) 
Dominican Republic
2  0.38  *  0.01 0.23 1.33 0.23 
  (0.98)  (0.05) (0.40) (0.64) (0.85) 
 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Coefficients are statistically significant at 5 percent level.  
Guatemala-1 is based on the 1996-2005 period and Guatemala-2 corresponds to the late-2001 to 2005 period, when the 
Bank of Guatemala started to formulate and implement monetary policy as an inflation targeter. 
1 Estimations for the Dominican Republic are based on quarterly data. 
2 Dummy variables are used to control for banking crises periods. 
 
One possible explanation to this puzzling outcome is that the assumption of perfect capital 
mobility, in particular in Honduras, but also in Nicaragua, is less binding, which makes room 
to central banks to exercise some monetary control. This explanation is mostly relevant for 
Honduras because the surrender requirement of foreign currency to the central bank inhibits 
the creation of a foreign exchange market.
28 In addition, in both countries the money market 
is shallow, which makes interest rates adjustment sluggish. 
 
                                                 
28 Other than this, in both countries capital inflows are less responsive to changes in the interest rate as they are 
large net recipients of foreign exchange from workers’ remittances and foreign aid.    22
The use of monetary aggregates to cope with inflation pressures in Honduras and Nicaragua, 
despite being exchange rate targeters may also be associated with IMF programs, which have 
been in effect in these two countries during most of the period of analysis. Standard IMF 
programs require central banks to observe quarterly monetary targets as performance criteria. 
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
Most Central American countries have succeeded in reducing inflation to the single-digit 
range. This outcome is not only the result of a drop in inflation in the rest of the world; it also 
follows from the Central American nations having maintained sound macroeconomic policies 
and adopted far-reaching structural reforms over more than 10 years. A key component of 
this macroeconomic strategy has been to give central banks enhanced autonomy to formulate 
and execute monetary policy. Today, central banks in Central America, like their peers in the 
rest of the region, are no longer development banks. They focus their policies on fighting 
inflation, although in some countries the central bank also embraces the parallel objective of 
preserving the external value of domestic currencies. 
 
Despite the progress achieved by the Central American central banks in reducing inflation, 
there is no room for complacency. Inflation in most countries is still high by regional and 
world standards. Moreover, central banks are still in the process of building reputation and 
credibility, which is expected not only to favor them to reduce further and stabilize inflation, 
but also to better withstand exogenous events, such as the recent oil shock that shifted 
inflation in some countries to the low two-digit range. 
 
While all central banks in the region enjoy more solid institutional strength, additional steps 
should be taken to underpin their credibility and achieve better inflation results. Progress is 
still necessary in four main areas to: (1) eliminate the latent policy conflict that emerges 
when monetary policy simultaneously seeks the internal and external stability of the domestic 
currency; (2) strengthen political autonomy to untie monetary policy horizons from political 
cycles; (3) grant financial autonomy to reinforce current de jure operational autonomy of 
central banks; and (4) set more rigorous accountability and transparency procedures to 
bolster the credibility of monetary policy. 
 
Central banks in Central America have made important strives in modernizing monetary 
operations, but this is also an area where there is room for improvement. While central banks 
established indirect instruments of monetary policy many years ago, open market operations 
do not allow for price discovery as interest rates are generally determined exogenously by 
central banks. As a result, money markets in most countries are still shallow, whereas yield 
curves are rather artificial and convey meaningless information to both central banks and 
market participants. In addition, central banks have not been proficient in managing liquidity 
surplus—currently exacerbated by abundant international liquidity—and hence, changes in 
short-term central bank interest rates have not been followed by similar changes in 
commercial bank interest rates. 
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Tracing central bank reaction functions in Central America allows for establishing a 
connection between their institutional setting and monetary policy implementation. The 
quantitative analysis developed in this paper allows us to get a sense of the main thrust of 
monetary policy in the sample countries. It confirms that central banks, in general, behave by 
increasing interest rates to curtail inflationary pressures, although with different impetus in 
each country. In other words, some central banks are raising interest rates less than what is 
required to tame inflation pressures.  
 
A second empirical regularity is that all central banks, except for the Dominican Republic, 
also care about the stability of the exchange rate, which may blur their true policy objective. 
They react by adjusting upward interest rates either to prevent deviations from the targeted 
purchasing power parity, or to confront pressures on the exchange rate with the aim of 
mitigating pass-through effects of exchange rate depreciations on prices and because of the 
so-called “fear of floating.” By the same token, these central banks also seem to 
systematically resist exchange rate appreciations, which would otherwise support 
disinflation. In addition, central banks in Costa Rica and Guatemala exhibit a policy of 
accommodating inflation trends into exchange rates performance with the aim of preserving 
the competitiveness of their tradable activities. 
 
The potential policy conflicts facing central banks in Central America are probably 
undermining markets’ confidence in their commitment to price stability. The fact that central 
banks are unable to deliver a predictable monetary policy and signal at times mutually 
excluding policy objectives—such as seeking the internal and external value of the 
currency—may help to understand the perpetuation of an inflation bias in Central America. 
 
While this paper steps up the understanding of monetary policy in Central America, 
additional analytical work is needed to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy. Areas 
for further research include: (1) analyzing how the transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy work in this region; (2) identifying the most appropriate exchange rate regime 
applicable to the Central American countries, given their increasing openness and integration 
with the U.S. economy and the growing remittance s from abroad; and (3) defining the most 







APPENDIX I: CENTRAL AMERICA: MAIN PROVISIONS OF CENTRAL BANK LEGISLATION AS OF 2005 
 
 Costa  Rica  Dominican  Republic  Guatemala  Honduras  Nicaragua 
Policy  Mandate        
Central bank 
objective. 
The Central Bank of Costa 
Rica (CBCR) will have as 
its main objectives to 
preserve the internal and 
external value of the 
domestic currency and 
promote the normal 
functioning of the 
payments system. 
The regulation of the 
monetary system (includes 
the Central Bank of the 
Dominican Republic and 
the Superintendence of 
Banks) shall aim to 
maintain price stability, 
which is the necessary 
basis for the nation’s 
economic development. 
The Bank of Guatemala 
(BoG)’s fundamental 
objective is to help create and 
maintain the most favorable 
conditions for the orderly 
development of the national 
economy. It should promote 
monetary, exchange, and 
credit conditions conducive to 
price stability. 
The Central Bank of 
Honduras (CBH) will have 
as its primary objectives to 
preserve the internal and 
external value of the 
domestic currency and 
promote the normal 
functioning of the 
payments system. 
The Central Bank of 
Nicaragua (CBN)’s primary 
objective is the stability of 
the national currency and 
the normal functioning of 




      
Government body 
of the central bank. 
Board of Directors (BoD) 
comprises 7 members, 
including its president, the 
Minister of Finance and 5 
other members. 
Monetary Board (MB) 
comprises 9 members, 
including the Governor of 
the CBDR, the Minister of 
Finance and the 
Superintendent of Banks 
(the last two ex-oficio 
members), plus another 6 
members. 
Monetary Board (MB) 
comprises 9 members, 
including its president, the 
ministers of Public Finances, 
Economy, and Agriculture, 
representatives of the 
Congress, the largest State-
owned university, the banking 
association, and the private 
entrepreneur’s association. 
Board comprises 5 
members, including its 
president. 
Board of Directors (BoD) 
comprises 6 members, 
including its president, the 
Minister of Finance, and 4 
members in consultation 
with the private sector, 
including 1 nominated by 




members of the 
government body. 
The President of the BoD 
is appointed by the 
Executive Counsel. He 
also appoints the other 5 
members, but these are 
ratified by Congress. 
The Governor of the 
CBDR and 6 members of 
the MB are directly 
appointed by the President 
of the Republic. 
The President of the MB is 
appointed by the President of 
the Republic, whereas the 
other members of the MB are 
appointed by the institution 
they represent. 
All 5 members are directly 
appointed by the President 
of the Republic. 
The President of the 
Republic directly appoints 
the President of the BoD, 
and 4 members. The latter 
are ratified by Congress.  
Term of 
appointment 
The President of the BoD 
is appointed for the same 
term as the executive 
branch. The other 5 
members last 90 months 
and are appointed every 
18 months, one at a time. 
The Governor of the 
CBDR and the 6 members 
of the MB are appointed 
for 2 years. The term of 
the ex-oficio members is 
according to their nature. 
The term of the President of 
the MB is 4 years, which does 
not coincide with that of the 
President of the Republic. 
Members of  MB appointed 
by the private sector and the 
university have one year 
renewable appointments. 
Two members of the 
Board appointed for the 
same 4 years as the 
President of the Republic 
and the other 3 area 
appointed on a staggered 
basis. 
The President of the BoD 
and the representative of the 
opposition political party 
last the same period as the 
Presidential term. The other 
three members are 
appointed in the middle of 
the presidential term. 
Dismissal  While the President of the 
BoD can be freely 
removed by the executive 
The Governor may be 
dismissed on the basis of a 
unanimous request by the 
The President of the MB is 
removed only upon legal 
grounds, but Congress has the 
Members of the Board are 
dismissed—following an 
investigation—by the 
Members of the BoD are 
dismissed—following an 





branch, the five members 
of the BoD are removed 
only on legal grounds—
also by the executive 
branch. 
MB, while the members of 
the MB may be removed 
upon ¾ of the votes in the 
MB under given legal 
grounds. 
right to dismiss him—with a 
qualified majority—if its 
annual report before Congress 
is not found satisfactory. 
executive, branch on legal 
grounds, including “lack 
of professional 
competence in the conduct 
of their duties.”  
executive, branch on legal 
grounds, including “lack of 
professional competence in 
the conduct of their duties.” 
Economic 
Autonomy 




The CBCR’s BoD is 
responsible of formulating 
and conducting monetary, 
exchange rate, and credit 
policies. 
The MB is in charge of 
formulating monetary, 
exchange, and financial 
policies. They are 
responsible for approving 
the monetary program and 
monitoring its execution. 
The formulation of monetary 
policy corresponds to the MB 
and the conduct of monetary 
policy to an Execution 
Committee (EC). However, 
Congress has to approve 
BoG’s paper that will be used 
in open-market-operations. 
The CBH has the legal 
mandate to formulate and 
execute monetary policy. 
The CBN is in charge of 
formulating and executing 
monetary policy in 
coordination with the 
government’s economic 
policy, but subordinating 
this coordination to the 
CBN’s observance of its 
primary objective.  
Central bank 
lending to the 
government. 
The CBCR is allowed to 
buy treasury bills in the 
primary market at a 
market rate. The balance 
of treasury bills can not 
exceed at any one moment 
1/20 of the government’s 
expenditure. 
The CBDR can not extend 
credit directly or indirectly 
to the government except 
under emergency 
conditions as regulated in 
the central bank law. 
The BoG is not allowed to 
provide—directly or 
indirectly—credit to the 
government (constitutional 
mandate). 
The CBH is not allowed to 
provide—directly or 
indirectly—credit to the 
government. However, it 
can provide advances to 
cope with seasonal 
liquidity shortages. These 
loans are limited to 10 
percent of the previous 
year’s tax revenue. 
The CBN can not provide 
credit—directly or 
indirectly—to the 
government. However, it 
can provide short-term 
advances in exchange for 
treasury bonds up to 10 
percent of the average tax 
revenues recorded in the 
previous two fiscal years. 
Central bank role 
on public debt 
policy. 
The CBCR is informed 
about new issues of public 
debt. 
No role.  The BoG must issue a 
technical report every time 
the public sector issues debt. 
The CBH provides a legal 
criterion before the 





To safeguard financial 
stability, the BCCR can 
rediscount securities to 
financial institutions under 
specific conditions. It also 
provides emergency loans 
as defined in the law to 
institutions intervened by 
the financial authority. 
The CBDR provides 
financial assistance to 
illiquid but solvent banks. 
The amount is capped at 
1½ times the impaired 
bank’s equity at a 30 days 
maturity. Financial 
conditions are defined by 
the CBDR. 
The BoG is empowered to 
provide LOLR assistance 
only to illiquid but solvent 
banks. The amount of the 
assistance is limited to 50 
percent of the impaired bank 
capital. Liquidity assistance 
can not be granted more than 
two times in a year. 
The CBH can provide 
financial assistance to 
banks facing liquidity 
problems and in light of 
situations that challenge 
the stability of the 
financial system. 
LOLR only for liquidity 
purposes up to 30 days 
maturity without a 
maximum limit. The CBN 
defines the financial 
conditions of such loans. 
Financial 
Autonomy 
      
Central bank’s 
capital integrity. 
There is no legal provision 
requiring the government 
to compensate central 
bank losses. 
CBDR’s losses are 
required to be 
compensated with 
Treasury bonds issued at 
The BoG must inform the 
Ministry of Finance should 
operational losses arise. The 
Minister of Finance has to 
The CBH should register 
losses as receivables until 
agreement is achieved 
with the government about 
The government must 
restore CBN’s losses by 
transferring securities under 





market interest rates and at 
less than one year 
maturity. 
incorporate these losses in the 
next fiscal year budget, to be 
covered with marketable 
government securities. 
the mechanism and 
financial conditions to 
compensate such losses. 
This, in turn has to be 
approved by Congress. 
Central bank’s 
budget approval. 
The budget of the CBCR 
is approved by its BoD 
and then by the 
Government auditor. 
The MB is in charge of 
approving the CBDR’s 
budget. 
The MB is in charge of 
approving the BoG’s budget. 
The CBH presents its 
budget to the Ministry of 
Finance who submits it to 
Congress for approval. 
Approved by the BoD. 
Accountability 
and Transparency 
      
Accountability 
relative to its 
policy objective. 
The CBCR must publish 
its annual report within the 
first quarter of the year. 
The governor of the 
CBDR reports annually to 
the executive branch and 
submits to Congress the 
CBDR annual report. 
The President of the MB must 
appear in Congress twice a 
year to report on the policies 
implemented, with emphasis 
on the observance of the 
BoG’s objective. 
The Board will report once 
a year to Congress and 
twice a year to the 
executive branch about the 
outcome of its activities. 
Following a constitutional 
mandate, the governor of 
the CBN presents annually 
a general report before 
Congress. 
Disclosure of a 
monetary policy or 
inflation report. 
The CBCR must disclose 
once a year the monetary 
program and publish twice 
a year an analysis of its 
execution and prospects. 
The CBDR disseminates a 
summary of the monetary 
program once a year and 
an update on a quarterly 
basis. 
The BoG must publish twice 
a year an explanatory 
monetary policy report. 
No specific legal 
provision. 




The CBCR discloses once 
a year its detailed income 
statements certified by the 
internal auditor. Income 
statements should be 
certified by the CBCR’s 
internal auditor. 
Audited income 
statements have to be 
disclosed once a year 
certified by an internal 
auditor and also by an 
external audit firm. 
At least once a year, the BoG 
should disclose its income 
statement on an analytical 
basis. The BoG’s accounting 
practices are certified by an 
external audit firm with 
appropriate experience and 
reputation. 
The CBH publishes 
immediately after the end 
of the fiscal year its 
financial statements. 
Accounting practices and 
the fidelity of income 
statements are done by the 
Superintendent of Banks, 
but an external audit firm 
may also be hired. 
The CBN discloses monthly 
its financial statements. At 
the end of the fiscal year, it 
discloses financial 
statements certified by an 





The BCCR should publish 
BoD’s decisions on 
monetary policy. 
Disseminates a bulletin 
containing the main 
policy/legal decisions. 
The BoG discloses a 
summary of the main MB 
decisions. 
No specific provisions.  BoD’s decisions should be 
published. 
 






APPENDIX II: CENTRAL AMERICA: MAIN FEATURES OF MONETARY POLICY 
 
Key aspects  Costa Rica  Dominican Republic  Guatemala  Honduras  Nicaragua 
Policy 
objective 
Inflation and exchange rate 
stability. 
Low and stable inflation and 
stable exchange rate. 
Inflation for a two-year 
period. 
Internal and external 








Crawling peg according to a 
pre-announced daily rate of 
devaluation. There is no 
foreign currency surrender 
requirement but market 
participants must sell to the 
CBCR existing remaining 
surpluses. 
Flexible exchange regime.  Flexible exchange regime.   Crawling band of 14% 
width. The slope is the 
difference between 
domestic inflation and its 
main trading partners. 
Surrender requirement of 
foreign currency for export 
earnings. 
Crawling peg (with pre-
announced rate of 
depreciation). There is no 
foreign currency surrender 
requirement. 
  The exchange rate is 
determined in the interbank 
market based on a reference 
exchange rate. The latter is 
calculated by the CBCR from 
a weighted average of market 
transactions in t-2, adjusted 
by the average change in t-1. 
The CBCR satisfies public 
sector demands. 
The exchange rate is 
determined by the market’s 
supply and demand, but the 
CBDR may intervene. 
The exchange rate is 
determined by the market’s 
supply and demand, but the 
Bank of Guatemala 
(Banguat) intervenes to 
tame volatility according to 
a publicly known rule. 
In practice, the CBH 
satisfies all demands for 
foreign exchange. Market 
participants make bids 
taking as a reference the 
average exchange rate of 
the previous auction. 
Hence, the exchange rate 
generally evolves through 
the lower end of the band. 
The exchange rate is 
determined by the market’s 
supply and demand, but the 
CBN may intervene. 
Financial 
programming 
The Board of Directors (BoD) 
approves it every January and 
updates it by mid-year. 
Approved annually by the 
Monetary Board (MB) and 
reviewed quarterly. 
The Monetary Board (MB) 
approves a monetary 
program that is reviewed 
twice a year, but this is not 
the key framework for 
policy formulation. 
The Board of the CBH 
approves the monetary 
program and conducts 
reviews on a quarterly 
basis. 
The Board of Directors 
(BoD) approves it every 
year and conducts reviews 
with no regular basis but as 
needed. 
  The final objective is inflation 
and intermediate targets are 
currency issue, money 
supply, and credit to the 
private sector. 
The final objective is 
inflation and the 
intermediate targets are 
money base and net 
domestic assets. 
The final objective is 
inflation, in line with the 
target in the IT regime. 
Monetary variables are 
only indicative variables.  
The final objective is 
inflation and intermediate 
targets are CBH’s net 
international reserves and 
net domestic assets. 
The final objective is 
inflation and the 





The BoD is in charge of 
adopting policy decisions, in 
particular, those relative to 
monetary instruments. 
The Open Market 
Operations Committee 
(COMA) decides the 
changes on monetary policy. 
The MB approves the 
formulation of monetary 
policy and the Execution 
Committee (EC) conducts 
monetary policy deciding 
changes in the interest rate. 
While the Board of CBH 
formulates monetary 
policy, the Open Market 
Operations Committee 
(COMA) is the executor. 
While the BoD formulates 
monetary policy, the Open 
Market Operations 
Committee (COMA) is the 





  While the BoD meets 
regularly every week, 
decisions concerning the 
leading rate are not adopted 
on a regular basis during key 
meetings. 
The COMA meets regularly 
every Wednesday, but the 
market is not aware of those 
meetings. There is no 
specific date in which the 
COMA reviews the stance 
of monetary policy. 
The EC meets regularly 
every week (generally on 
Fridays). The market is 
aware that decisions about 
the policy rate are 
considered during the 
meeting after the 15
th of 
each month. 
The Board of the CBH 
meets regularly each 
Thursday and the COMA 
once a month. The market 
ignores when the CBH 
Board will adopt a change 
in the policy rate. 
Both the BoD and the 
COMA meet separately 
once a week. The latter 
assesses the financial 
parameters to apply in the 
weekly auctions. There are 
no specific meetings to 




Reserve requirements. 15% 
on deposits in domestic and 
foreign currencies. 
Maintenance period of two 
weeks, with averaging 
provisions. Reserve 
requirements were changed 
once in 2004 (from 10 to 
12%) and in 2005 (from 12 to 
15%). 
Reserve requirements. 20% 
for commercial banks and 
15% for other financial 
institutions. Commercial 
banks have a daily and 
weekly maintenance period 
for domestic and foreign 
currencies, respectively. 
Other financial institutions 
have two-weeks and one 
month maintenance periods. 
Reserve requirements. 
14.6% (0.6% remunerated) 
on deposits in domestic and 
foreign currency. The 
maintenance period is one 
month with averaging 
provisions. Reserve 
requirements have not been 
modified since 1999. 
Reserve requirements. 
12% in domestic and 
foreign currencies. 
Maintenance period of 14 
days and averaging 
provisions. In foreign 
currency there is another 




16.25% on deposits in 
domestic and foreign 
currencies. Maintenance 
period of one week without 
compensation within the 
period. 
  Two modalities of open 
market operations: (i) Short-
term investments in the 
CBCR at 7, 15, and 30 days; 
and (ii) auctions of CBCR’s 
zero-coupon securities (at 3, 
6, 9, and 12 months) and 
coupon securities (at 2, 3, 5, 
and 7 years). Only banks and 
brokerage houses are 
authorized to participate in 
the auctions. 
Open market operations are 
held on a weekly basis under 
multiple-price auctions of 
“certificates of 
participation,” zero coupon, 
and long-term securities at 
35, 91, 182, and 364 days 
maturity. All economic 
agents can participate. The 
CBDR also offers short and 
long-term deposit facilities 
at rates that are consistent 
with those of the auctions. 
The Banguat conducts open 
market operations at 7, 91, 
and 182 days, and to 1, 2, 
4, 6, and 8 years. Only 
financial institutions 
participate. It also conducts 
auctions of time deposits at 
same maturities (except 7 
days) in domestic and 
foreign currencies. All 
economic agents participate 
in the latter via brokerage 
houses. 
The CBH conducts open 
market operations in 
domestic currency and a 
limited amount in foreign 
currency. It holds weekly 
auctions (at 7 days) and by-
weekly auctions (at 90, 
180, and 360 days). While 
in the former only financial 
institutions participate, the 
latter is open to other 
market participants. 
The CBN calls for auctions 
once a week and offers 
securities at 3 months and 1 




Liquidity forecasting every 
two weeks based on its 
financial programming. This 
is the basis to define the 
absorption needed to observe 
monetary targets envisaged in 
the financial programming. 
The CBDR conducts weekly 
liquidity forecasting based 
on the financial 
programming. 
The Banguat conducts 
liquidity forecasting on a 
daily basis. The EC uses 
this information to plans 
weekly open market 
operations. 
The CBH conducts weekly 
liquidity forecasting for 
each working day. It serves 
to define the amounts to 
issue in open market 
operations. 
The CBN elaborates a 
monthly liquidity 
forecasting, on the basis of 
the financial programming 
after adjusting for seasonal 
trends. 
  The CBCR uses its deposit 
facilities (at 7, 15, and 30 
days) to drain liquidity. 
Interest rates are directly 
fixed by the CBCR. 
The CBDR manages 
liquidity through the weekly 
open market operations  
The auctions at 7 days 
maturity are aimed at 
managing short-term 
liquidity. 
The CBH uses the weekly 
auctions to handle short-
term liquidity and by-
weekly auctions to manage 
structural liquidity. 
Open market operations 
aim at observing the 
international reserves 
target—as established in its 





  There is a shallow interbank 
market for overnight 
transactions of government 
and central bank securities. 
There is a shallow interbank 
market based on certificates 
of deposit, which do not 
require pledging collateral. 
There is an interbank 
market, mainly repo 
operations conducted 
through the stock 
exchange. 
There is a shallow 
interbank market. The 
transactions do not use any 
collateral as government 
and CBH’s securities are 
non-negotiable. 
There is an interbank 
market. However, the CBN 
is in the process of 
ascertaining how 
significant this market is. 
  The CBCR conducts 
overnight repo operations but 
no reverse repo transactions. 
The CBDR does not conduct 
repo operations. 
The Banguat holds repo 
transactions at 7 days 
maturity using government 
and own securities as 
collateral. 
The CBH does not make 
repo operations. 
The CBN does not conduct 






The CBCR defines the 30-
days interest rate paid in its 
deposit facility as its policy 
rate. This rate is not market-
determined. 
There is no specific policy 
signaling. Markets ascertain 
CBDR’s policy stance 
depending on its weekly 
open market operations. 
The Banguat uses the 7 
days interest rate as a 
policy rate. The EC 
changes the rate with the 
intention of signaling 
Banguat’s policy stance. 
The CBH uses as a policy 
rate the 7-days interest 
rates resulting from the 
weekly auctions. 
The international reserves 
is the operational target and 




The CBCR has not 
established daily standing 
facilities. 
Standing facilities at up to 7 
days maturity. The COMA 
sets interest rates and banks 
pledge CBDR’s paper as 
collateral in the credit 
facility. 
There are no standing 
facilities available. 
Overnight deposit and 
credit facilities (pledging 
CBH’s securities as 
collateral). As of end-2005, 
interest rates are +/- 4% of 
the policy rate respectively. 
Only an overnight credit 
facility at market rates. To 
be used no more than four 
times a month, with at least 
two days in between. Banks 




There is no specific legal 
provision for appearances 
before Congress of the 
Governor of the CBCR.  
The Governor reports 
annually to the executive 
branch and submit to 
Congress an annual report. 
The governor appears 
before congress twice a 
year to report on Banguat’s 
policies. 
The Board of the CBH 
reports once a year to the 
legislative and twice a year 
to the executive branch. 
The Governor reports 
annually to the executive 
branch. No legal provision 
for appearance in Congress. 
  The CBCR disseminates 
twice a year an inflation 
report. It also discloses 
monthly and biannually an 
economic report. 
The CBDR prepares and 
disseminates a monetary 
policy report. It also 
discloses a quarterly 
economic report. 
The Banguat prepares and 
disseminates a monetary 
policy report twice a year. 
The CBH does not prepare 
an inflation report but it 
prepares a quarterly report 
about major developments 
in the Honduran economy. 
The CBN discloses a report 
on a quarterly basis—with 
a 6 to 8 weeks lag—
monitoring the monetary 
program.  
  The CBCR publishes the 
decisions adopted concerning 
monetary policy, but not the 
minutes of the discussions 
behind such policy decisions. 
It publishes the decisions 
adopted concerning 
monetary policy, but not the 
minutes of the discussions 
behind such policy 
decisions. 
The Banguat discloses the 
minutes underlying the 
decisions adopted by the 
EC. 
The CBH publishes the 
decisions adopted 
concerning monetary 
policy, but not the minutes 
of the discussions behind 
such policy decisions. 
The CBN publishes the 
decisions adopted 
concerning monetary 
policy, but not the minutes 
of the discussions behind 
such policy decisions. 
 
Source: Answers to Questionnaire on Monetary Policy.     
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APPENDIX III:  POLICY REACTION FUNCTION 
 
The policy reaction function would work as follows: assume that within each operating 
period the central bank has a target for the interest rate, 
*
t i , that is based on the state of the 
economy. Let it also be assumed that monetary authorities care about stabilizing inflation and 
output, so we allow for the possibility that the central bank adjusts its policy response to 
anticipated inflation and output. Specifically: 
 
  [ ] () [ ] ( )
** * || tt n t t m t ii E E y y βπ πγ ++ =+ Ω− + Ω− , (1) 
 
where i is the long-run equilibrium interest rate,  tn π +  is the rate of inflation between periods 
t and t+n,  tm y +  is real output between periods t and t+m, and 
* π  and 
* y  are the targets for 
inflation and output, respectively. In particular, 
* y  is defined as the equilibrium level of 
output that would arise if wages and prices were perfectly flexible. Additionally, E is the 
expectation operator and  t Ω  is the information available to the policy maker. The expression 
could include additional independent terms such as the exchange rate and international 
reserves. 
 
To capture concerns about potentially disruptive shifts in the interest rate, it is assumed that 
the interest rate is adjusted only partially to its target level: 
 
  ( )
*
1 1 tt t t ii i v ρρ − = −++ , (2) 
 
where the parameter  [ ] 0,1 ρ ∈  captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. The exogenous 
random shock to the exchange rate,  t v , is assumed to be i.i.d. To define an estimable 
equation, let 
* i α βπ =−  and 
*
tt x yy =−, then equation (2) can be written as:  
 
  [ ] [ ]
* || tt n t t m t iE E x αβπ γ ++ =+ Ω + Ω . (3) 
 
So, combining equation (3) with the partial adjustment mechanism (2) and eliminating the 
unobserved forecast variables yields: 
 
  () ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 tt n t m t t ix i ρ αρ β π ρ γρ ε ++ − =− +− +− + +, (4) 
 
where the error term  t ε  is a linear combination of the forecast errors of inflation and output, 
and the exogenous disturbance  t υ . 
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Let  t u  be a vector of variables (set of instruments) within the policymaker’s information set 
(i.e.,  tt u ∈Ω ) that are orthogonal to  t ε . Possible elements of  t u  include any lagged variables 
that help forecast inflation and output, as well as any contemporaneous variables that are 
uncorrelated with the current exchange rate shock  t υ . Thus, since [ ] |0 tt Eu ε = , the following 




  () ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 | 0 tt n t m t t Ei x i u ρα ρβ π ργ ρ ++ − −− −− −− − = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . (5) 
 
Equation (5) is estimated over the sample period from 1996 to 2005 with year-on-year CPI 
inflation, detrended IMAE (using the Hodrick-Prescott filter), and the nominal interest rate. 
Baseline elements of  t u  are lagged values of CPI inflation, output, and the interest rate. The 
forward-looking horizons are varied (values n and m in the case of inflation and output, 




                                                 
29 The use of an optimal weighting matrix implies that GMM estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form. It is worth noting that the GMM technique requires no information about the 
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